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With very few exceptions, recent research in fair division has mostly focused on deterministic allocations.
Deviating from this trend, we study the fairness notion of interim envy-freeness (iEF) for lotteries over
allocations, which serves as a sweet spot between the too stringent notion of ex-post envy-freeness and
the very weak notion of ex-ante envy-freeness. iEF is a natural generalization of envy-freeness to random
allocations in the sense that a deterministic envy-free allocation is iEF (when viewed as a degenerate lottery). It
is also certainly meaningful as it allows for a richer solution space, which includes solutions that are provably
better than envy-freeness according to several criteria. Our analysis relates iEF to other fairness notions as
well, and reveals tradeos between iEF and eciency. Even though several of our results apply to general
fair division problems, we are particularly interested in instances with equal numbers of agents and items
where allocations are perfect matchings of the items to the agents. Envy-freeness can be trivially decided
and (when it can be achieved, it) implies full eciency in this setting. Although computing iEF allocations in
matching allocation instances is considerably more challenging, we show how to compute them in polynomial
time, while also maximizing several eciency objectives. Our algorithms use the ellipsoid method for linear
programming and ecient solutions to a novel variant of the bipartite matching problem as a separation
oracle. We also study the extension of interim envy-freeness notion when payments to or from the agents
are allowed. We present a series of results on two optimization problems, including a generalization of the
classical rent division problem to random allocations using interim envy-freeness as the solution concept.
CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms; Algorithmic game
theory and mechanism design.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: fair division, envy-freeness, random allocations, rent division, price of
fairness
ACM Reference Format:
Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, and Maria Kyropoulou. 2021. On Interim Envy-Free Allocation
Lotteries. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ’21), July 18–23, 2021,
Budapest, Hungary. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 21 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467648
1 INTRODUCTION
Plenty of situations arise in the real world every day, where assets need to be distributed among
individuals. Making sure that everyone gets what they are entitled to is an imperative, yet vague,
aspiration that is open to interpretation. Fair division is a research area that deals with problems of
distributing assets in a way that is considered fair. Fair allocation problems, that focus on indivisible
items, have received considerable attention from the EconCS community recently.
Among the fairness notions that have been proposed to capture the necessity for impartiality
and justice, envy-freeness [21, 36] is, without doubt, the prevailing one. Envy-freeness requires
that each individual, or agent, prefers their own share to anyone else’s. However natural and
intuitive, though, envy-freeness may not be possible to achieve. In addition, the universality of fair
division disputes justies many dierent denitions of fairness. Some popular fairness notions in
the literature include proportionality and max-min fair share, among others.
The vast majority of the related literature focuses on deterministic allocations. The few recent
exceptions (e.g., [3, 7, 22]) that consider random allocations (lotteries or probability distributions
over allocations) are either too liberal or too conservative in the fairness concepts they consider.
For example, ex-ante envy-freeness compares the random bundle allocated to an agent, in terms of
expected valuation, to the random bundle allocated to any other agent. Ex-ante envy-freeness is very
weak as a fairness guarantee. Indeed, a lottery that allocates all items to an agent selected uniformly
at random is ex-ante envy-free; clearly, such a lottery can hardly be considered fair. On the other
extreme, the notion of ex-post envy-freeness requires that every outcome of a random allocation
is envy-free. Ex-post envy-freeness is very strict and essentially invalidates the advantages of
randomness.
The notion of interim envy-freeness [31] serves as middle ground between ex-post and ex-ante
envy-freeness, balancing between the stringency of the constraint and the substance of the fairness
guarantee. In particular, consider an instance where a set of indivisible items are to be allocated to
a set of agents, and a xed, publicly known, lottery over allocations. Let an outcome of the lottery
be realized and each agent observe only their own allocation. Each agent, then, compares their
wealth to the random bundle allocated to any other agent, conditioned upon their own realized
allocation. Let, for example, the lottery have many possible outcomes (allocations in its support),
but only two of which allocate the bundle 0 of items to agent 1; let agent 2 obtain bundle 1 in the
rst of these outcomes and bundle 2 in the second one. The interim envy-freeness constraint for
agent 1 with respect to agent 2 and bundle 0, is satised if the value that agent 1 has for 0 is at
least as high as her average value for 1 and 2 , according to the probability that agent 2 receives
them (the relative probability of the two outcomes in the lottery). If such a constraint is satised for
every agent, with respect to every other agent and any possible bundle, i.e., everyone’s allocated
bundle is always worth to them at least what they can estimate anyone else is receiving, then the
lottery is said to be interim envy-free.
Interim envy-freeness can be naturally extended to accommodate for payments, similarly to the
recent fair allocation literature [24, 27]. It is a known fact that payments can help eliminate envy
in the deterministic allocation case, both in the form of subsidies paid to the agents to compensate
for an unsatisfactory bundle, and in the form of rent payments paid by the agents to make their
allocation look less desirable to others. Rent division [2] is a fundamental fair allocation problem
involving payments, where the input consists of a total rent amount, a set of agents, and an equal
number of rooms on which the preferences of agents are expressed. The goal is to assign a price to
each room so that the room prices sum up to the total rent, and to match agents to rooms so that
everyone prefers their own allocation and rent share. Using the interim envy-freeness concept, we
consider natural extensions of problems with payments to the random allocation case, both in the
rent division and in the subsidy distribution context.
Matching allocation instances, as in the rent division setting just discussed, are relevant in many
applications; hence, we partially focus on this case. An important technical advantage is that such
instances allow for an easy computation of (deterministic) envy-free allocations, as opposed to
general allocation instances, for which relevant problems are typically NP-hard. However, allowing
randomization seems to make the situation considerably more complex. Interestingly, as we will see,
the added complication still allows for positive computational results related to interim envy-free
lotteries.
1.1 Overview and Significance of Our Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, interim envy-freeness (iEF) has not received any attention by the
EconCS community. We justify its importance as a fairness notion for lotteries of allocations,
by demonstrating a rich menu of interesting properties it enjoys. First, we relate it to the most
important fairness properties for deterministic allocations and lotteries. In terms of strength as a
fairness property, iEF is proved to lie between proportionality and envy-freeness in the following
way. Clearly, when viewed as a degenerate lottery, any envy-free allocation is iEF. Also, every
iEF lottery is dened over proportional allocations. These implications are shown to be strict in a
strong sense. We show that there are allocation instances that admit proportional allocations but no
iEF lottery, and instances that admit iEF lotteries but no envy-free allocation. Compared to fairness
properties for lotteries, iEF lies between ex-ante envy-freeness (which can be always attained
trivially) and ex-post envy-freeness (which is too restrictive). These ndings and observations
appear in Section 3.
Our next goal is to explore the trade-os between iEF and economic eciency (Section 4). We pay
special attention to matching allocation instances where envy-freeness implies Pareto-eciency
and optimal utilitarian, egalitarian, and average Nash social welfare. A careful interpretation of
these facts reveals that envy-freeness is a very restrictive fairness property. In contrast, as less
restrictive, iEF lotteries may not be Pareto-ecient and can furthermore produce allocations of
suboptimal social welfare. We provide tight or almost tight bounds on the price of iEF with respect
to the utilitarian, egalitarian, and average Nash social welfare. These bounds suggest that iEF
allocations can have social welfare that is up to Θ(=) times far from optimal, where = is the number
of agents.
Bounds on the price of iEF give only rough estimates of the best social welfare of iEF lotteries.
We present polynomial-time algorithms for computing iEF lotteries that maximize the utilitarian,
egalitarian, and log-Nash social welfare. Our algorithms follow a general template that can be
briey described as follows. The problem of computing an iEF lottery of maximum social welfare is
formulated as a linear program. This linear program has exponentially many variables; to solve
it, we exploit the execution of the ellipsoid method to its dual. As the dual linear program has
exponentially many constraints, the ellipsoid method needs access to polynomial-time separation
oracles that check whether the dual variables violate the dual constraints or not. We design such
separation oracles by exploiting connections to maximum edge-pair-weighted bipartite perfect
matching (2EBM), a novel (to the best of our knowledge) combinatorial optimization problem
that involves perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. We show how to solve 2EBM in polynomial
time by exploiting an elegant lemma by Cruse [19] on decompositions of doubly-stochastic centro-
symmetric matrices. We believe that 2EBM is a natural combinatorial optimization problem of
independent interest and with applications in other contexts. These computational results appear
in Section 5 and constitute the most technically intriguing results in the paper.
Finally, we extend the denition of interim envy-freeness to accommodate for settings where
monetary transfers (payments) are allowed. We dene and study two related optimization problems.
In subsidy minimization, which is motivated by a similar problem for deterministic allocations that
was studied recently, we seek iEF pairs of lotteries and payments to the agents so that the total
expected amount of payments is minimized. In utility maximization, which extends the well-known
rent division problem, we seek iEF pairs of lotteries and payments that are collected from the agents
and contribute to a xed rent; the objective is to maximize the minimum expected agent utility. We
consider dierent types of payments depending on whether the payments are agent-specic, bundle-
specic, or unconstrained (i.e., specic to agents and allocations). iEF is proved to be considerably
more powerful than envy-freeness, allowing for much better solutions to the two optimization
problems compared to their deterministic counterparts. We also showcase the importance of both
agent-specic and bundle-specic payments by showing that they are incomparable to each other,
in the context of the two optimization problems. By applying our computational template, we
present ecient algorithms that compute optimal solutions to subsidy minimization and utility
maximization using unconstrained payments, violating the iEF condition only marginally. These
results are presented in Section 6. We believe that they attest to the signicance of interim envy-
freeness too and will motivate further study.
Due to lack of space, several proofs and intermediate statements have been omitted. They will
appear in the nal version of the paper.
1.2 Further Related Work
Previous work on randomness in allocation problems is clearly related to ours. Aziz [6] discusses the
benets of randomization in social choice settings, including fair division, thus supporting relevant
studies despite the related challenges. Gajdos and Tallon [23] study ex-ante and ex-post notions
of fairness in a setting with an inherent uncertainty imposed by the environment. More recently,
Aleksandrov et al. [3] analyze the ex-post and ex-ante envy-freeness guarantees of particular
algorithms for online fair division. Freeman et al. [22] study the possibility of achieving ex-ante
and ex-post fairness guarantees simultaneously in the classical fair allocation setting. For example,
they show that there always exists an ex-ante envy-free lottery, with all allocations in its support
satisfying a relaxed fairness property known as envy-freeness up to one item (EF1; see [13]). They
furthermore show that such lotteries can be computed eciently. In very recent work, Aziz [7]
strengthens some of these results.
Interim envy-freeness was rst dened by Palfrey and Srivastava [31] (see also [20, 37]). Even
though the intuition behind the iEF notion in those papers coincides with ours, their settings are
dierent. They are more complex in the sense that the value of an agent for a bundle may depend
on the allocation, but they are more restrictive as the lottery probabilities are xed in advance. Our
setting is more suitable to formulate and study existence and computational questions.
Randomness is an important design tool for mechanisms that compute solutions in matching
allocation instances. In a slightly dierent context than ours (e.g., see [28]), agents are assumed
to have ordinal preferences on the items. Mechanisms such as the probabilistic serial rule [11]
introduce randomness to avoid the discrimination between agents, and achieve ex-ante fairness
guarantees for all cardinal valuations that are compatible to the ordinal preferences. Other rules in
this line of research include random priority [1], vigilant eating [8], and several extensions of the
probabilistic serial rule [14].
Previous work on subsidy minimization has focused on envy-freeness as the solution concept.
The objective is to compute an allocation and appropriate payments to the agents so that agents
are non-envious for the combinations of payments and bundles of items they receive. The work
of Maskin [30] seems to be the rst treatment of the problem, without optimizing subsidies
though. The notion of envy-freeability refers to an allocation that can become envy-free when
paired with appropriate payments. Halpern and Shah [27] present a characterization that indicates
that envy-freeability is strongly connected to a no-positive-cycle property in an appropriately
dened envy graph. Alternatively, envy-freeable allocations maximize the utilitarian social welfare
with respect to all bundle redistributions among the agents. Among other results, Halpern and
Shah [27] aim to bound the amount of subsidies assuming that all agent valuations are in [0, 1].
They conjecture that subsidies of = − 1 suce; an even stronger version of the conjecture is proved
by Brustle et al. [12]. Complexity results for subsidy minimization are presented by Caragiannis
and Ioannidis [15]. Another study that blends fairness (including envy-freeness) with payments is
the work of Chevaleyre et al. [18] on distributed allocations of items.
Rent division had attracted attention much before subsidy minimization [5, 33, 34]. A very similar
characterization of envy-freeable allocations [4, 35] like the one mentioned above, has allowed for
a simple solution in [24] to the problems of maximizing the minimum agent utility and minimizing
the disparity between agent utilities. Earlier, the papers [2, 26, 29] present algorithms for computing
envy-free rent divisions without considering optimization criteria.
2 PRELIMINARIES
An instance of an allocation problem consists of a set N of = agents and a set I of< items. Agent
8 ∈ N has valuation E8 ( 9) for item 9 ∈ I. By abusing notation, we use E8 (() to denote the valuation
of agent 8 for the set (or bundle) of items ( . We assume that valuations are non-negative and additive,
i.e., E8 (() =
∑
9 ∈( E8 ( 9). We remark, though, that several of our results (including the concept of
interim envy-freeness, which we dene later in this section) carry over to more general valuations.
Furthermore, even though this is rarely required for our positive statements, in our examples we
use normalized valuations satisfying
∑
9 ∈I E8 ( 9) = 1 for every agent 8 ∈ N .
An allocation  = (1, 2, ..., =) of the items in I to the agents of N is simply a partition of
the items of I into = bundles 1, 2, ..., = , with the understanding that agent 8 ∈ N gets the
bundle of items 8 . An allocation  = (1, 2, ..., =) is envy-free (EF) if E8 (8 ) ≥ E8 (: ) for every
pair of agents 8 and : . In words, the allocation  is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of
items that has been allocated to some other agent to her own. The allocation  is proportional if
E8 (8 ) ≥ 1= E8 (I). An instance may not admit any envy-free or proportional allocation; to see why,
consider an instance in which all agents have a positive valuation of 1 for a single item (and zero
value for any other item). It is well-known that, due to additivity, an envy-free allocation is always
proportional.
Envy-freeness is dened accordingly if monetary transfers are allowed. In particular, a pair of
an allocation  and a vector p consisting of a payment ?8 to each agent 8 ∈ N is envy-free with
payments if E8 (8 ) + ?8 ≥ E8 (: ) + ?: for every pair of agents 8 and : . The term envy-freeable refers
to an allocation that can become envy-free with an appropriate payment vector. Depending on the
setting, payments can be restricted to be non-negative (e.g., representing subsidies that are given
to the agents [12, 15, 27]) or non-positive (e.g., when payments are collected from the agents, like
in the rent division problem [24]).
In addition to their fairness properties, allocations are typically assessed in terms of their eciency.





, ..., ′=) with E8 (′8 ) ≥ E8 (8 ) for every agent 8 ∈ N , with the inequality being strict
for at least one agent of N . The term social welfare is typically used to assign a cardinal score
that characterizes the eciency of an allocation. Among the several social welfare notions, the
utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash social welfare are the three most prominent. We use the notation
U(), E(), avN(), and lgN() to refer to the utilitarian, egalitarian, average Nash, and log-Nash
social welfare, respectively, of an allocation  = (1, ..., =); the corresponding eciency scores
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8∈N









ln E8 (8 ).
The price of fairness, introduced independently in [9] and [16], refers to a class of notions that
aim to quantify trade-os between fairness and eciency. For example, the price of envy-freeness
with respect to the utilitarian social welfare for an allocation instance (that admits at least one
envy-free allocation) is the ratio of the optimal utilitarian social welfare of the instance over the
utilitarian social welfare of the best envy-free allocation. Dierent price of fairness notions follow
by selecting dierent fairness concepts and social welfare denitions.
We are particularly interested in matching allocation instances, in which the number of agents
is equal to the number of items. Our assumptions (e.g., for non-negative valuations) imply that
the only reasonably fair (e.g., proportional) allocations should then assign (or match) exactly one
item to each agent. We refer to such allocations as matchings.1 Notice that, an envy-free matching
must allocate to each agent her most-valued item. As such, whenever an envy-free allocation exists
in a matching instance, it is Pareto-ecient and maximizes the social welfare, according to all
denitions of social welfare mentioned above. Hence, the price of envy-freeness is trivially 1 in
this case (with respect to all the social welfare denitions given above).
Random allocations and interim envy-freeness
We consider random allocations that are produced according to lotteries (or probability distribu-
tions). The lottery Q over allocations of the items of I to the agents of N is ex-ante envy-free
if E∼Q [E8 (8 )] ≥ E∼Q [E8 (: )] for every pair of agents 8, : ∈ N . Q is ex-post envy-free if any
allocation it produces with positive probability is envy-free (or, in other words, if all allocations in
the support of Q are envy-free).
We now provide the formal denition of the central concept of this paper. We say that a lottery
Q over allocations is interim envy-free (iEF) if for any pair of agents 8, : ∈ N and any possible
bundle of items ( that agent 8 can get in a random allocation produced by Q, it holds
E8 (() ≥ E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] .
The denition of iEF requires that the value agent 8 has when she gets a bundle ( is at least as high
as the average value she has for the bundle that agent : gets, conditioned on 8’s allocation.
We extend the notion of interim envy-freeness to pairs of lotteries over allocations and payments
to/from the agents, in an analogous way that recent work has dened envy-freeness with payments.
In fact, we dierentiate between dierent payment schemes with respect to whether payments are
per agent (A-payments), per bundle (B-payments), or per allocation and agent (C-payments). We
similarly extend the notion of price of fairness and envy-freeability to the case of iEF. We postpone
providing formal denitions for the corresponding sections that these notions are being examined.
3 INTERIM ENVY-FREENESS VS. OTHER FAIRNESS NOTIONS
In this section we compare interim envy-freeness with other fairness notions, with the aim to
identify possible fairness implications. The rst implication follows easily by the denitions and
has been observed before in more general contexts than ours (e.g., see [37]).
Lemma 3.1. Any iEF lottery Q is ex-ante envy-free.
Proof. Indeed, using the denitions of iEF, ex-ante envy-freeness and well-known properties of
random variables, we have
E∼Q [E8 (8 )] =
∑
(⊆I
E8 (() · Pr∼Q [8 = (] ≥
∑
(⊆I
E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] · Pr∼Q [8 = (]
= E∼Q [E8 (: )],
for every pair of agents 8 and : . 
1
We typically use the small letter 1 to denote a matching, instead of the usual notation of  for allocations in general
instances.
An even simpler observation is that any lottery that deterministically produces an envy-free
allocation  is trivially iEF. Indeed, 8 is the only bundle that can be given to agent 8 , who weakly
prefers it to the bundle : that is allocated to agent : . Trivially, E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] = E8 (: )
and the iEF condition is identical to the envy-freeness condition E8 (8 ) ≥ E8 (: ). We can slightly
extend this argument to obtain the following implication.
Lemma 3.2. Any ex-post envy-free lottery Q is iEF.
However, the opposite is not true; we show below that the existence of an iEF allocation does
not imply the existence of an EF allocation. This is important as it indicates that the set of iEF
allocations is larger than those of EF ones.
Lemma 3.3. There exist allocation instances with an iEF lottery but with no EF allocation.
Proof. Consider the matching allocation instance at the left of Table 1 and the lottery Q which
returns matchings 0-1-2 and 0-2-1, with probability 1/2 each. As agents 2 and 3 have maximum
possible value in each of the two matchings produced by Q, EF and, consequently, iEF conditions
for them are satised. To see that the iEF condition is satised for agent 1, observe that she is
allocated item 0 in both matchings in the support of Q, for which she has a value of 1/3. Agent 2
(and, similarly, agent 3) gets item 1 with probability 1/2 and item 2 with probability 1/2. Agent
1’s average value for the item agent 2 (or agent 3) gets is 2/3 · 1/2 + 0 · 1/2 = 1/3. Hence, the
iEF condition for agent 1 with respect to agent 2 (and, similarly, for agent 1 with respect to 3) is
satised. The proof that the lottery Q is iEF is complete.
0 1 2
1 1/3 2/3 0
2 0 1/2 1/2
3 0 1/2 1/2
0 1 2
1 1/3 2/3 0
2 0 2/3 1/3
3 1/4 1/2 1/4
Table 1. The two matching instances that are used in the proofs of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5 to distinguish between
iEF, EF, and proportionality. Throughout the paper, we consider several examples with three agents and items
0, 1, and 2 . A concise notation like 0-2-1 is used to represent the matching in which agents 1, 2, and 3 get
items 0, 2 , and 1, respectively.
In the same example, it can be easily seen that there is no EF allocation. Indeed, as the only agent
who has positive value for item 0 is agent 1, agent 1 should get this item and be envious of the
agent who gets item 1. The proof of the lemma is complete. 
Our next lemma relates iEF to proportionality and is used extensively in our proofs.
Lemma 3.4. Any allocation in the support of an iEF lottery is proportional.
Proof. Consider an iEF lottery Q and any agent 8 ∈ N . By the denition of iEF, we have that
for any allocation in the support of Q where agent 8 gets the bundle of items ( , it holds that
E8 (() ≥ E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] for each other agent : . By summing up over all other agents we get
(= − 1)E8 (() ≥
∑
:≠8
E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] = E∼Q [
∑
:≠8
E8 (: ) |8 = (] = E8 (I \ ().
By adding E8 (() to both sides of the above inequality and rearranging, we get E8 (() ≥ 1= E8 (I),
implying that any allocation in the support of Q is proportional. 
However, iEF is a stronger property than proportionality as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 3.5. There exist allocation instances with a proportional allocation but with no iEF lottery.
Proof. Consider the instance at the right of Table 1. In this instance, allocation 0-2-1 is the
only proportional allocation. Hence, by Lemma 3.4, to show that no iEF lottery exists, it suces to
consider only the (lottery that deterministically returns) allocation 0-2-1. In this allocation, agents
1 and 2 are envious of agent 3, contradicting the iEF requirement. 
Our next lemma quanties the disparity between envy-freeness and interim envy-freeness; the
proof exploits Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.6. The maximum envy at any allocation in the support of an iEF lottery, when the agent
valuations are normalized, can be as high as 1 − 2
=
and this is tight.
4 INTERIM ENVY-FREENESS VS. EFFICIENCY
We now explore tradeos between interim envy-freeness and eciency. Two well-studied rene-
ments of Pareto-eciency are relevant for lotteries of allocations: ex-ante and ex-post Pareto-
eciency. A lottery Q over allocations is ex-ante Pareto-ecient if there exists no other lottery
Q′ such that E∼Q′ [E8 (8 )] ≥ E∼Q [E8 (8 )] for every agent 8 ∈ N , with the inequality being strict
for at least one agent of N . A lottery is ex-post Pareto-ecient if all allocations in its support are
Pareto-ecient. It is well-known that ex-ante Pareto-eciency implies ex-post Pareto-eciency.
For allocation instances with two agents, the allocations in the support of an iEF lottery are
envy-free and, thus (as observed in Section 2), Pareto-ecient. This is due to the fact that any
allocation in the support of an iEF lottery is proportional (by Lemma 3.4) and hence envy-free, since
there are only two agents. This implies that an iEF lottery is ex-post and ex-ante Pareto-ecient.
2
In the following, we show that this may not be the case in instances with more agents.
Theorem 4.1. There exist matching instances with = ≥ 3 agents in which no iEF lottery is ex-post
(and, consequently, ex-ante) Pareto-ecient.
To assess the impact of fairness in random allocations to social welfare, we need to extend the
price of fairness denition to lotteries. We do so implicitly here by dening the price of iEF (one
can similarly dene, e.g., the price of ex-ante envy-freeness). We say that the price of iEF with
respect to a social welfare measure is the worst-case ratio over all allocation instances with at least
one iEF lottery, of the optimal social welfare in the instance over the expected social welfare of the
best iEF lottery (where “best” is dened with respect to this social welfare measure).
In our next theorems, we bound the price of iEF with respect to dierent social welfare notions.
In the proof of our upper bounds, we consider normalized valuations. This is a typical assumption
in the related literature as well, e.g., see [16]. This assumption is not necessary for average Nash
social welfare.
Theorem 4.2. The price of iEF with respect to the utilitarian, egalitarian, and average Nash social
welfare is at most =, when the agent valuations are normalized.
Proof. The proof follows by Lemma 3.4, which implies that the valuation of each agent in any
allocation in the support of an iEF lottery is at least 1/=. Then, the utilitarian, egalitarian, and
average Nash social welfare is at least 1, 1/=, and 1/=, respectively, while the corresponding optimal
values are at most =, 1, and 1, respectively. 
The next two statements indicate that our price of iEF upper bounds with respect to utilitarian
and egalitarian social welfare are asymptotically tight.
2
It can be easily seen that ex-post and ex-ante Pareto-eciency coincide for matching allocation instances with two agents.
This is not true in general.
Theorem 4.3. The price of iEF with respect to the utilitarian social welfare is at least Ω(=).
Proof. Let n > 0 be negligibly small and : ≥ 2 be an integer. We use the following matching
instance with = = 2: agents and items. For 8 = 1, 2, ..., : , agent 8 has value :
:+1 for item 8 , value
1
:+1
for item 8 + : , and value 0 for any other item. For 8 = : + 1, : + 2, ..., 2: , agent 8 has value 1
2:
+ n for
items 1, 2, ..., : and value 1
2:
− n for items : + 1, ..., 2: .





− :n . To see why, consider
the allocation in which agent 8 gets item 8 for 8 = 1, 2, ..., 2: . We now claim that no iEF lotteryQ over





+:n . The lower bound on the price of iEF will follow by
the relation between = and : (and by taking n to be suciently small). Indeed, by Lemma 3.4, the




+ :n . Then, the maximum value each of the agents 1, 2, ..., : gets from the items
: + 1, ..., 2: is 1
:+1 .
It remains to present such a lottery Q. It suces to assign item 8 +: to agent 8 for 8 = 1, 2, ..., : and
assign uniformly at random the items 1, 2, ..., : to the agents : + 1, ..., 2: . Clearly, agents : + 1, ..., 2:
are not envious. For 8 = 1, ..., : , agent 8 has value 1
:+1 . Her expected value for the item of another
agent ℓ is 0 if ℓ is one of the : rst agents besides 8 and 1
:+1 if ℓ is one of the : last agents. Notice
that in the latter case, agent ℓ gets item 8 (for which agent 8 has value :
:+1 ) with probability 1/: ,
while she gets items for which agent 8 has no value otherwise. 
Theorem 4.4. The price of iEF with respect to the egalitarian social welfare is at least Ω(=).
A very similar proof to the one of Theorem 4.3 yields our best (albeit not known to be tight)
lower bound for the price of iEF with respect to the average Nash social welfare.





5 COMPUTING EFFICIENT INTERIM ENVY-FREE ALLOCATIONS
We devote this section to proving Theorem 5.1 and show how we can compute an iEF lottery of
maximum expected social welfare eciently in the case of matching instances. We remark that,
in the case of non-matching instances (where the number of items is larger than the number of
agents), deciding whether an iEF lottery exists is an NP-hard problem.
3
Theorem 5.1. For matching instances, an iEF lottery of maximum expected utilitarian, egalitarian,
or log-Nash social welfare (if one exists) can be computed in polynomial time in terms of the number
of agents.
Our algorithms use linear programming. Let M be the set of all possible perfect matchings
between the agents inN and the items in I (more formally,M is the set of all perfect matchings in
the complete bipartite graph  = (N ,I,N × I)). For agent 8 ∈ N and item 9 ∈ I, denote by M8 9
the set of matchings fromM in which item 9 is assigned to agent 8 . Also, for a matching 1 ∈ M
and an agent : ∈ N , 1 (:) denotes the item of I to which agent : is matched in 1. Then, an iEF
3
To see this, consider the case of two agents and recall that (i) an iEF lottery is a lottery over proportional allocations
(Lemma 3.4), and (ii) a proportional allocation is envy-free and (trivially) iEF. Hence, the existence of an iEF lottery is
equivalent to the existence of a proportional/EF allocation in the case of two agents. Now, if we consider instances with
identical valuations (in which both agents have value E (6) for item 6), deciding whether an iEF lottery exists is equivalent
to deciding Partition, a well-known NP-hard problem.








G (1) · (E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) ≥ 0, 8 ∈ N , 9 ∈ I, : ∈ N \ {8}∑
1∈M
G (1) = 1
G (1) ≥ 0, 1 ∈ M
(1)
The variables of the linear program are the probabilities G (1), for every matching 1 ∈ M, with
which the lottery produces matching 1. Together with the non-negativity constraints on x, the
second constraint
∑
1∈M G (1) = 1 requires that the vector of probabilities x = (G (1))1∈M denes a
lottery over all matchings ofM. The notation SW(1) is used here to refer generally to the social
welfare of matching 1. We will specically replace SW by U, E, and lgN later. The objective of
the linear program is to maximize the expected social welfare E1∼x [SW(1)] or, equivalently, the
quantity
∑
1∈M G (1) · SW(1).
The rst set of constraints represent the iEF conditions. Indeed, the constraint is clearly true
for every agent 8 ∈ N and item 9 ∈ I that is never assigned to agent 8 under x (i.e., when
Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9] = 0). We will also show that this is the case when Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9] > 0 as well. For
agent : ∈ N \ {8}, interim envy-freeness requires that
E8 ( 9) ≥ E1∼x [E8 (1 (:)) |1 (8) = 9] . (2)
By multiplying the left-hand-side of (2) with Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9], we get
E8 ( 9) · Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9] =
∑
1∈M8 9
G (1) · E8 ( 9),
and by doing the same with the right-hand-side, we have
E1∼x [E8 (1 (:)) |1 (8) = 9] · Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9] =
∑
1∈M8 9
G (1) · E8 (1 (:)) .
Hence, inequality (2) is equivalent to the rst constraint of the linear program (1).
The linear program (1) has exponentially many variables, i.e., one variable for each of the =!
dierent matchings of M. To solve it eciently, we will resort to its dual linear program
maximize I
subject to I + ∑
(8, 9) ∈1
:∈N\{8 }
(E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) · ~ (8, 9, :) + SW(1) ≤ 0, 1 ∈ M
~ (8, 9, :) ≥ 0, 8 ∈ N , 9 ∈ I, : ∈ N \ {8}
(3)
The dual linear program (3) has polynomially many variables and exponentially many constraints.
Fortunately, we will be able to solve it using the ellipsoid method [25, 32]. To do so, all we need
is a polynomial-time separation oracle, which takes as input values for the dual variables I and
~ (8, 9, :) for all triplets (8, 9, :) consisting of agent 8 ∈ N , item 9 ∈ I, and agent : ∈ N \ {8}, and
either computes a matching 1∗ for which a particular constraint is violated, or correctly concludes
that no constraint of the dual linear program (3) is violated.
Let us briey remind the reader how solving the dual linear program using the ellipsoid method
can give us an ecient solution to the primal linear program as well; a more detailed discussion
can be found in [25, 32]. To solve the dual linear program, the ellipsoid method will make only
polynomiallymany calls to the separation oracle. This is due to the fact that, among the exponentially
many constraints, the ones that really constrain the variables of the dual linear program are very
few; the rest are just redundant. Then, after having kept track of the execution of the ellipsoid
method on the dual linear program, the primal linear program can be simplied by setting implicitly
to 0 all variables that correspond to dual constraints that were not returned as violated ones by
the calls of the separation oracle during the execution of the ellipsoid method. As a nal step, the
solution of the simplied primal linear program (which is now of polynomial size) will give us the
solution x; this will have only polynomially-many matchings in its support.
In the rest of this section, we will show how to design such separation oracles for the dual linear
program (3) when we use the utilitarian, egalitarian, or log-Nash denition of the social welfare.
Our separation oracles essentially solve instances of a novel variation of the maximum bipartite
matching problem. We believe that this can be of independent interest, with applications in many
dierent contexts.
The maximum edge-pair-weighted perfect bipartite matching
Instances of the maximum edge-pair-weighted perfect bipartite matching problem (or, 2EBM, for
short) consist of the complete bipartite graph  = (N ,I,N × I) with a weighting functionk that
assigns weight k (41, 42) to every ordered pair of non-incident edges 41 and 42 from N × I. The








k ( (8, 9), (:, ℓ)), (4)
is maximized.
4
Let X be the set of quadruples (8, 9, :, ℓ) where 8, : ∈ N and 9, ℓ ∈ I, with 8 ≠ : and 9 ≠ ℓ .
We can view such a quadruple as the ordered pair of edges (8, 9) and (:, ℓ) in the input graph  .
Essentially, the quadruples of X correspond to all possible ordered pairs of dierent edges in the
input graph. To compute a perfect matching 1 ∈ M of maximum total edge-pair weight, we will use
the following integer linear program with Θ(=4) variables and constraints (where = is the number
of agents and items). We remark that, from now on, we simplify the notationk ((8, 9), (:, ℓ)) and









C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = 1, 8 ∈ N , : ∈ N \ {8}∑
8,:∈N:
(8, 9,:,ℓ) ∈X
C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = 1, 9 ∈ I, ℓ ∈ I \ { 9}
C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = C (:, ℓ, 8, 9), (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X
C (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ {0, 1}, (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X
(5)
For a quadruple (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X, the variable C (8, 9, :, ℓ) indicates whether both edges (8, 9) and (:, ℓ)
belong to the perfect matching (C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = 1) or not (C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = 0). The rst constraint indicates
that among all edge pairs with endpoints at agent nodes 8 and : , exactly one has both its edges in
the matching. Similarly, the second constraint indicates that among all edge pairs with endpoints
at item nodes 9 and ℓ , exactly one has both its edges in the matching. The third constraint ensures
symmetry of the variables so that they are consistent to our interpretation.
4
We remark that the problem of computing a perfect matching of maximum total edge weight in an edge-weighted complete
bipartite graph with edge weight F (4) for each edge 4 , is equivalent to 2EBM by dening the edge-pair weights of the
latter ask (4, 4′) = F (4 )
=−1 for every ordered pair of edges 4 and 4
′
.
We relax the integrality constraint of (5) and replace it by
C (8, 9, :, ℓ) ≥ 0, (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X. (6)
Then, we compute an extreme solution of the resulting linear program (e.g., again, using the ellipsoid
method [25, 32]). We claim (in Lemma 5.4) that this solution is integral, i.e., all variables have values
either 0 or 1, and are, hence, solutions to the integer linear program (5) and, consequently, to our
maximum edge-pair-weighted perfect bipartite matching problem.
To prove this, we can view the solution t of the relaxation of the linear program (5) as a square
matrix ) . In this matrix, each row corresponds to a pair of dierent agents and each column to a
pair of dierent items. Then, the rst and the second set of constraints indicate that ) is doubly
stochastic. Here, ideally, we would like to use the famous Birkho-von Neumann theorem [10],
which states that any doubly stochastic matrix is a convex combination of permutation matrices
(i.e., square binary matrices with exactly one 1 at each row and each column) and conclude that the
extreme solutions of the relaxation of the linear program (5) are integral and, hence, correspond to
perfect matchings. Unfortunately, the linear program (5) has the additional symmetry constraint
that does not allow for such a use of the Birkho-von Neumann theorem.
Fortunately, we can use an extension due to Cruse [19] which applies to centro-symmetric
matrices.
Denition 5.2. An # × # matrix ) = ()D,E)D,E∈[# ] is called centro-symmetric if it satises
)D,E = )#+1−D,#+1−E for all D, E ∈ [# ].
Theorem 5.3 (Cruse [19]). If # is even, then any # ×# centro-symmetric doubly stochastic matrix
is the convex combination of centro-symmetric permutation matrices.
We use Theorem 5.3 in the proof of the next lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Any extreme solution of the relaxation of the linear program (5) is integral.
Proof. We will dene an alternative representation of a feasible solution t of the relaxation of
the linear program (5) as a doubly stochastic matrix ) with # = =(= − 1) rows and columns. To do
so, we will use a particular mapping of each pair of dierent agents (respectively, of each pair of
dierent items) to particular rows (respectively, columns) of the matrix ) . This particular mapping
will allow us to argue that the matrix ) is centro-symmetric. As # is even, Theorem 5.3 will give
us that ) is a convex combination of centro-symmetric permutation matrices, which correspond to
integral solutions.
As both sets N and I contain = elements each, we may view them as integers from [=]. We
dene the bijection c from ordered pairs of dierent integers from [=] to integers of [# ] as follows.
For every ordered pair (8, :) of dierent integers from [=], let
c (8, :) =
8−1∑
ℎ=1
(= − ℎ) + : − 8
if 8 < : , and
c (8, :) = =(= − 1) + 1 − c (:, 8)
otherwise. By this denition, we have
c (8, :) + c (:, 8) = =(= − 1) + 1. (7)
Note that, for 8 = 1, 2, ..., = − 1 and : = 8 + 1, ..., =, c (8, :) takes all distinct integer values from 1
to =(= − 1)/2. Then, for the remaining pairs (8, :) with 8 = 2, ..., = and : = 1, ..., 8 − 1, c (8, :) takes
all distinct integer values from =(= − 1) down to =(= − 1)/2 + 1. Hence, since # = =(= − 1), each
distinct ordered pair of dierent integers from [=] is mapped to a dierent integer of [# ] under
c . Hence, c is indeed a bijection. Now, for every quadruple (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X, we store the value of
C (8, 9, :, ℓ) in the entry )c (8,:),c ( 9,ℓ) of matrix ) . By the properties of c , the matrix ) is well-dened.
We will complete the proof by showing that ) is centro-symmetric. Indeed, let D and E be any
integers in [# ] and assume that D = c (8, :) and E = c ( 9, ℓ) for pairs of distinct integers (8, :) and
( 9, ℓ). We have
)D,E = )c (8,:),c ( 9,ℓ) = C (8, 9, :, ℓ) = C (:, ℓ, 8, 9)
= )c (:,8),c (ℓ, 9) = )#+1−c (8,:),#+1−c ( 9,ℓ) = )#+1−D,#+1−E,
i.e., ) is indeed centro-symmetric. The rst and sixth equalities follow by the denition of D and
E . The second and fourth equalities follow by the denition of the entries of matrix ) . The third
equality is the symmetry constraint of linear program (5). The fth equality follows by (7). 
Hence, the execution of the ellipsoid algorithm on the relaxation of the linear program (5) will
return an integral solution that corresponds to a solution of 2EBM. The next statement summarizes
the above discussion.
Theorem 5.5. 2EBM can be solved in polynomial time.
We are ready to show how solutions to appropriately dened instances of 2EBM can be used
as separation oracles for solving the linear program (3) when SW is the utilitarian (Section 5.1),
egalitarian (Section 5.2), and log-Nash (Section 5.3) social welfare.
5.1 Utilitarian Social Welfare










E8 ( 9) + E: (ℓ)
2(= − 1) ,
and, using SW(1) = U(1), the constraint of the dual linear program (3) corresponding to a matching






(E8 ( 9) − E8 (ℓ)) · ~ (8, 9, :) +
E8 ( 9) + E: (ℓ)





So, consider the instance of 2EBM with edge weights dened as
k (8, 9, :, ℓ) = (E8 ( 9) − E8 (ℓ)) · ~ (8, 9, :) +
E8 ( 9) + E: (ℓ)
2(= − 1) +
I
=(= − 1) .
Then, for a matching 1 ∈ M, we have that the objective function of 2EBM, Ψ(1), shown in (4), is
equal to the left-hand-side of inequality (8) and, consequently, to the left-hand-side of the constraint
of the dual linear program (3), when the utilitarian denition of the social welfare is used.
Now, the separation oracle for the dual linear program (3) works as follows. It solves the instance
of 2EBM just described and computes a matching 1∗ ∈ M that maximizes the quantity Ψ(1), i.e.,
1∗ ∈ argmax1∈M Ψ(1). If Ψ(1∗) > 0, the constraint corresponding to the matching 1∗ in the dual
linear program (3) is returned as a violating constraint. Otherwise, it must be Ψ(1) ≤ 0 for every
matching 1 ∈ M and the separation oracle correctly returns that no such violating constraint
exists.
5.2 Egalitarian Social Welfare
Let ! denote the dierent values the valuations E8 ( 9) of an agent 8 for item 9 can get, i.e., ! = {E8 ( 9) :
8 ∈ N , 9 ∈ I}. For 4 ∈ !, denote by M4 the set of perfect matchings so that for any agent 8 that is
assigned to item 9 , it holds that E8 ( 9) ≥ 4 . Observe that the perfect matching 1 ∈ M belongs to
set M4 for every 4 ≤ E(1). Then, the constraints of the dual linear program (3) for the egalitarian










≤ 0, 4 ∈ !,1 ∈ M4 (9)
Indeed, for every matching 1 ∈ M, the set of constraints (9) contains the constraint corresponding





(E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) · ~ (8, 9, :) + 4 ≤ 0,
for 4 ∈ ! with 4 < E(1) (if any). So, to design the separation oracle for the dual linear program (3),
it suces to design a separation oracle for the set of constraints (9), for each of the O(=2) dierent
values of 4 ∈ !. We now show how to do so.
For 4 ∈ !, let X4 be the subset of X such that E8 ( 9) ≥ 4 and E: (ℓ) ≥ 4 . Essentially, the quadruples
of X4 correspond to all possible (ordered) pairs of dierent edges in a perfect matching ofM4 . Now,
for every 4 ∈ !, consider the instance of 2EBM with weights
k (8, 9, :, ℓ) = (E8 ( 9) − E8 (ℓ)) · ~ (8, 9, :) +
4 + I
=(= − 1)
for quadruple (8, 9, :, ℓ) ∈ X4 . Then, for a matching 1 ∈ M4 , the objective function of 2EBM, Ψ(1),
shown in (4), is equal to the left-hand-side of inequality (9). Now, for each 4 ∈ !, the separation
oracle computes the matching 1∗4 that maximizes the quantity Ψ(1) among all matchings ofM4 .
A violating constraint (corresponding to matching 1∗4 ) is then found if Ψ(1∗4 ) > 0 for some 4 ∈ !.
Otherwise, the separation oracle concludes that no constraint is violated.
5.3 Log-Nash Social Welfare










ln E8 ( 9) + ln E: (ℓ)
2(= − 1) .
Hence, the only modication that is required in the approach we followed for the utilitarian social
welfare is to replace the term
E8 ( 9)+E: (ℓ)
2(=−1) by
ln E8 ( 9)+ln E: (ℓ)
2(=−1) in the denition ofk .
6 INTERIM ENVY-FREE ALLOCATIONS WITH PAYMENTS
In this section, we extend the notion of interim envy-freeness by accompanying lotteries over
allocations with payments to/from the agents. In this case, the denition of iEF uses both the value
an agent has for item bundles and the payment she receives or contributes. We distinguish between
three dierent types of payments. A vector of agent-dependent payments or A-payments consists of
a payment ?8 for each agent 8 ∈ N . More rened payments are dened using additional information
for an allocation instance. We say that the agents receive bundle-dependent payments or B-payments
when each agent is associated with a payment of ? (() when she receives the bundle of items ( .
Finally, we say that the agents get allocation-dependent payments or C-payments when each agent 8
is associated with payment ?8 () in allocation .
We now extend the notion of interim envy-freeness to pairs of lotteries and payments by
distinguishing between the three payment types.
Definition 6.1. We say that a pair of a lottery Q and a vector of A-payments p is iEF if for every
pair of agents 8, : ∈ N and every bundle of items ( agent 8 can get under Q, it holds E8 (() + ?8 ≥
E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] + ?: .
Definition 6.2. We say that a pair of a lottery Q and a vector of B-payments p per bundle of items
is iEF if for every pair of agents 8, : ∈ N and every bundle of items ( agent 8 can get under Q, it holds
E8 (() + ? (() ≥ E∼Q [E8 (: ) + ? (: ) |8 = (].
For C-payments, we give a more general denition that allows for marginal violations of iEF.
The notion of n-iEF will be useful later in Section 6.3.
Definition 6.3. Let n ≥ 0. We say that a pair of a lottery Q and a vector of C-payments p per
agent and allocation is n-iEF if for every pair of agents 8, : ∈ N and every bundle of items ( agent 8
can get under Q, it holds E8 (() + E∼Q [?8 () |8 = (] ≥ E∼Q [E8 (: ) + ?: () |8 = (] − n .
The term iEF with C-payments is used alternatively to 0-iEF. We remark that the payments are
added to the value agents have for bundles in the above denitions. So, in general, the payments
are assumed to be received by the agents. To represent payments that are contributed by the agents,
we can allow negative entries in the payment vectors. We also remark that the denitions refer
to general allocation instances. Indeed, the result we present in Section 6.1 applies to general
instances. Then, in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we restrict our attention to matching instances and adapt
the denitions accordingly.
Our technical contribution regarding iEF allocations with payments is many-fold. First, we
characterize in Section 6.1 those lotteries Q that can be complemented with vectors of A-payments
p, so that the pairQ, p is iEF with A-payments. There, our focus is on the existence of payments, with
no additional restrictions on them. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we specically consider two particular
optimization problems that involve iEF allocations with payments; we dene these problems in the
following.
In both optimization problems, we are given an allocation instance and the objective is to compute
a lottery Q over allocations and a payment vector p so that the pair Q, p is iEF with payments. In
subsidy minimization, the payments are subsidies given to the agents by an external authority. So,
the corresponding entries in the payment vector p are constrained to be non-negative. The goal of
subsidy minimization is to nd an iEF allocation and accompanying payments, such that the total
expected amount of subsidies is minimized; the objective is equal to
∑
8∈N ?8 , E∼Q [
∑
8∈N ? (8 )],
or E∼Q [
∑
8∈N ?8 ()], depending on whether p is an A-, B-, or C-payment vector, respectively.
Subsidyminimization is the generalization of the problem that was recently studied for deterministic
allocations and envy-freeness in [12, 15, 27].
Our second optimization problem is called utility maximization and can be thought of as an
extension of rent division [24] to lotteries and iEF. There is a rent ' and the payments are contri-
butions from the agents that, in expectation, should sum up to '. So, the entries in the payment
vector p are constrained to be non-positive. The goal is to nd an iEF allocation and accompanying
payments, such that the minimum expected utility over all agents is maximized. Depending on
whether the problem asks for A-, B-, or C-payments, the utility of agent 8 ∈ N from allocation  is
E8 (8 ) + ?8 , E8 (8 ) + ? (8 ), and E8 (8 ) + ?8 (), respectively.
As we will see in Section 6.2, both subsidy minimization and utility maximization admit much
better solutions compared to their versions with deterministic allocations and envy-freeness that
had been previously studied in the literature. In addition, the quality of solutions depends on the
type of payments. We demonstrate that there is no general advantage of A- or B-payments against
each other; this justies the importance of both types of payments. Clearly, C-payments allow for
the best possible solutions as they generalize both A- and B-payments. In Section 6.3, we restrict our
focus on matching instances and show how to solve subsidy minimization and utility maximization
eciently, by exploiting the machinery we developed in Section 5.
6.1 A Characterization for A-Payments
We now extend the notion of envy-freeability from recent works focusing on the use of subsidies in
fair division settings (e.g., see [12, 15, 27]), and earlier studies in rent division (e.g., see [4, 35]). Given
an allocation instance and a lottery Q over allocations, we say that Q is iEF-able with A-payments
if there is a vector p of A-payments so that the pair Q, p is iEF. Even though we will not need these
terms here, we can dene the term iEF-ability with B- or C-payments analogously.
Our main result in this section (Theorem 6.5) will be a characterization of the lotteries that are
iEF-able with A-payments. The notion of the interim envy graph will be very useful; it extends the
notion of the envy-graph that is central in the characterization of envy-freeable allocations (see,
e.g., [27]).
Definition 6.4. Given a lottery Q over allocations of the items in set I to the agents in set N ,
the interim envy graph iEG(Q,N ,I) is a complete directed graph with = nodes corresponding to the
agents of N , and edge weights dened as




E∼Q [E8 (: ) |8 = (] − E8 (()
}
for every directed edge (8, :).
Our characterization follows; it extends well-known characterizations for deterministic envy-
freeable allocations, e.g., see [24, 27]. A quick comparison reveals that the second condition in
Theorem 6.5 is much less restrictive than an analogous condition for envy-freeability, which asserts
that envy-freeable allocations locally maximize the utilitarian social welfare among all possible
redistributions of the bundles to the agents. This justies our claim that the space of iEF-able
lotteries is quite rich.
Theorem 6.5. For a lottery Q over allocations, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Q is iEF-able with A-payments.
(ii) For every agent 8 ∈ N , let (8 be any bundle of items that is allocated to agent 8 with positive
probability according to Q. Also, let f : N → N be any permutation of agents. Then,∑
8∈N
E8 ((8 ) ≥
∑
8∈N
E∼Q [E8 (f (8) ) |8 = (8 ] .
(iii) The interim envy graph iEG(Q,N ,I) has no cycle of positive weight.
6.2 Contrasting A-Payments with B-Payments
We now attempt a comparison between dierent types of payments. First, we remark that iEF
lotteries with A-payments (or B-payments) can yield much lower total expected subsidies and
much higher minimum expected utility for utility maximization instances, compared to envy-free
allocations with payments. This should be clear given Lemma 3.3; we give explicit bounds on
subsidy minimization and utility maximization with the next example.
Example 6.6. Consider the instance at the left of Table 2. By the characterization of Halpern
and Shah [27], we know that in matching instances only the most ecient allocation of items to
agents is envy-freeable. Therefore, 0-1-2 and 0-2-1 are the only envy-freeable allocations and this is
possible with a payment of 1/3 to agent 1 (or, to item 0) and no payments to the other two agents
(or, to the other two items). In contrast, the lottery that has both allocations in its support with
equal probability is iEF without any payments.
0 1 2
1 1/3 2/3 0
2 0 1/2 1/2
3 0 1/2 1/2
0 1 2
1 1/4 3/4 0
2 0 1/2 1/2
3 0 1/2 1/2
Table 2. An instance of subsidy minimization (le) and utility maximization (right) with three agents where
envy-freeness is inferior to iEF with A- and B-payments.
Now, consider the matching instance at the right of Table 2 and let ' = 1. Again, 0-1-2 and 0-2-1
are the only envy-freeable allocations. The rent shares that make each of them EF are 0, 1/2, and
1/2 to agents 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Note that agents 2 and 3 obtain utility 0 under these payments.
In contrast, the lottery that has both allocations in its support with equal probability is iEF with
payments 1/6, 5/12, and 5/12 by agents 1, 2, and 3, (or, to items 0, 1, 2) which sum up to 1. The
(expected) utility of each agent is then 1/12. 
We now compare A-payments to B-payments in terms of the quality of the solutions they yield
the two optimization problems. In particular, the proof of Theorem 6.7 presents instances where
B-payments are superior to A-payments.
Theorem 6.7. The solution of subsidy minimization and utility maximization with B-payments
can be strictly better than the solution of the corresponding problems with A-payments.
The proof of Theorem 6.7 shows two instances, of subsidy minimization and utility maximization,
respectively. For subsidy minimization, the expected amount of subsidies achieved with B-payments
is arbitrarily close to 0, while A-payments need a constant amount of subsidies. Similarly, in the
utility maximization instance, the minimum expected agent utility is arbitrarily close to 0 with
A-payments and considerably higher with B-payments.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are also instances where A-payments are preferable to B-payments.
Theorem 6.8. The solution of subsidy minimization and utility maximization with A-payments
can be strictly better than the solution of the corresponding problems with B-payments.
6.3 Computing n-iEF Allocations with C-Payments
In this section, we show how to solve eciently subsidy minimization and utility maximization
when we are allowed to use C-payments (and sharp approximations of iEF). Our algorithms
use linear programming and the machinery we developed in Section 5. Our result for subsidy
minimization is the following.
Theorem 6.9. Let n > 0. Consider an instance of subsidy minimization with C-payments and let
OPT be the value of its optimal solution. Our algorithm computes a lottery Q and a C-payment vector
p of expected value OPT, so that the pair Q, p is n-iEF with C-payments.
We begin by dening a linear program for computing an iEF pair of lottery and C-payment
vector. We use the variable vector x to denote the lottery. By Denition 6.3, the iEF constraint for
agent 8 ∈ N who is assigned item 9 ∈ I with positive probability under lottery x and another agent
: ∈ N \ {8} is
E8 ( 9) + E1∼x [?8 (1) |1 (8) = 9] ≥ E1∼x [E8 (1 (:)) + ?: (1) |1 (8) = 9] . (10)
By multiplying the left-hand-side of (10) with the positive probability Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9], we get




G (1) · E8 ( 9) +
∑
1∈M8 9
G (1) · ?8 (1). (11)
By multiplying the right-hand-side of (10) again with Pr1∼x [1 (8) = 9], we obtain




G (1) · E8 (1 (:)) +
∑
1∈M8 9
G (1) · ?: (1). (12)
Hence, using (11) and (12), (10) yields∑
1∈M8 9
(G (1) · (E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) + G (1) · ?8 (1) − G (1) · ?: (1)) ≥ 0. (13)
Notice the products G (1) ·?8 (1) and G (1) ·?: (1) in the above expression. In such terms, both factors
are unknowns that we have to compute. As ?8 (1) always appears multiplied with G (1) in the above
expressions, we can avoid non-linearities by introducing the variable C8 (1) for every agent 8 ∈ N
and matching 1 ∈ M to be thought of as equal to G (1) · ?8 (1). With this interpretation in mind,
equation (13) becomes ∑
1∈M8 9
(G (1) · (E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) + C8 (1) − C: (1)) ≥ 0.





























(G (1) · (E8 ( 9) − E8 (1 (:))) + C8 (1) − C: (1)) ≥ 0,8 ∈ N , 9 ∈ I, : ∈ N \ {8}∑
1∈M
G (1) = 1
G (1) ≥ 0, 1 ∈ M
C8 (1) ≥ 0, 1 ∈ M, 8 ∈ N
(14)
Lemma 6.10. The linear program (14) can be solved in polynomial time.
The proof of Lemma 6.10 follows along similar lines to the approach we followed in Section 5. A
solution of the linear program (14) naturally gives an iEF pair of lottery x and C-payments vector p
when G (1) = 0 for a matching 1 ∈ M implies that C8 (1) = 0 for every agent 8 ∈ N . Unfortunately,
we have not excluded the case that G (1) = 0 and C8 (1) > 0 in the solution of the linear program
(14). We take care of such cases by modifying the solution returned by our algorithm and violating
the iEF condition marginally. The next lemma completes the proof of Theorem 6.9.
Lemma 6.11. For every n > 0, given any extreme solution to the linear program (14) of objective
value OPT, an n-iEF lottery x′ with C-payments p′ of total expected value OPT can be computed in
polynomial time.
Our result for utility maximization is the following.
Theorem 6.12. Let n > 0. Consider an instance of utility maximization with C-payments and let
OPT be the value of its optimal solution. Our algorithm computes a lottery Q and a C-payment vector
p of expected value at least OPT − n , so that the pair Q, p is n-iEF with C-payments.
7 OPEN PROBLEMS
We believe that interim envy-freeness can be a very inuential fairness notion and can play for
lotteries of allocations the role that envy-freeness has played for deterministic allocations. Our
work aims to reinvigorate the study of this notion; we hope this will further intensify the study of
fairness in random allocations overall. At the conceptual level, iEF can inspire new fairness notions,
analogous to known relaxations of envy-freeness, such as envy-freeness up to one (EF1; see [13])
and up to any item (EFX; see [17]), that have become very popular recently. Even though it is very
tempting, we refrain from proposing additional denitions here.
An appealing feature of iEF lotteries is that they are eciently computable in matching allocation
instances. Of course, besides the importance of the ellipsoid algorithm in theory (see, e.g., [25, 32]),
our methods have apparent limitations. Combinatorial algorithms for solving the computational
problems addressed in Sections 5 and 6.3 are undoubtedly desirable. An intermediate rst step
would be to design a combinatorial algorithm for the maximum edge-pair-weighted perfect bipartite
matching problem (2EBM). This could be useful elsewhere, as 2EBM is a very natural problem with
possible applications in other contexts.
At the technical level, there is room for several improvements of our results. Our bounds on the
price of iEF with respect to the average Nash social welfare have a gap between Ω(
√
=) (Theorem 4.5)
and O(=) (Theorem 4.2). Also, in Section 5, we show how to compute iEF lotteries that maximize the
expected log-Nash social welfare. Although maximizing log-Nash and average Nash social welfare
are equivalent goals for deterministic allocations, this is not the case for lotteries. Computing iEF
lotteries of maximum expected average Nash welfare is elusive at this point.
We left for the end the many open problems that are related to iEF with payments. Our charac-
terization in Section 6.1 has been used only in the proof of Theorem 6.7. It would be interesting to
see whether it has wider applicability and, in particular, whether it can lead to ecient algorithms
for computing iEF pairs of lotteries with A-payments. This is not clear to us, as our characteriza-
tion seems to be much less restrictive than existing ones for envy-freeability (which, e.g., have
given rise to transforming the rent division problem to a bipartite matching computation [24]).
Furthermore, characterizations of iEF-ability with B- or C-payments are currently elusive. Our
results in Section 6.2 reveal gaps on the quality of solutions for the two optimization problems that
the dierent types of payments allow. Our analysis in the proofs of Theorems 6.7 and 6.8 is not
tight; determining the maximum gap between A-, B, and C-payments on the quality of solutions
for subsidy minimization and utility maximization is open. Finally, from the computational point
of view, our solutions to subsidy minimization and utility maximization yield pairs of lotteries and
C-payments that are only approximately iEF. Can these problems be solved exactly? Also, solving
both subsidy minimization and utility maximization with A- or B-payments will be of practical
importance. What is the complexity of these problems?
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